A Data-driven Adversarial Examples Recognition Framework via Adversarial
  Feature Genome by Chen, Li et al.
A Data-driven Adversarial Examples Recognition Framework
via Adversarial Feature Genome
Li Chen
Central South University
School of Geosciences and Info-Physics
vchenli@csu.edu.cn
Hailun Ding
Central South University
School of Computer and Engineering
dhl317618@gmail.com
Qi Li
Central South University
School of Computer and Engineering
dsjliqi@csu.edu.cn
Jiawei Zhu
Central South University
School of Geosciences and Info-Physics
jw zhu@csu.edu.cn
Jian Peng
Central South University
School of Geosciences and Info-Physics
PengJ2017@csu.edu.cn
Haifeng Li*
Central South University
School of Geosciences and Info-Physics
lihaifeng@csu.edu.cn
Abstract
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are easily
spoofed by adversarial examples which lead to wrong clas-
sification results. Most of the defense methods focus only
on how to improve the robustness of CNNs or to detect ad-
versarial examples. They are incapable of detecting and
correctly classifying adversarial examples simultaneously.
We find that adversarial examples and original images have
diverse representations in the feature space, and this differ-
ence grows as layers go deeper, which we call Adversarial
Feature Separability (AFS). Inspired by AFS, we propose a
defense framework based on Adversarial Feature Genome
(AFG), which can detect and correctly classify adversar-
ial examples into original classes simultaneously. AFG is
an innovative encoding for both image and adversarial ex-
ample. It consists of group features and a mixed label. With
group features which are visual representations of adversar-
ial and original images via group visualization method, one
can detect adversarial examples because of AFS of group
features. With a mixed label, one can trace back to the origi-
nal label of an adversarial example. Then, the classification
of adversarial example is modeled as a multi-label classifi-
cation trained on the AFG dataset, which can get the orig-
inal class of adversarial example. Experiments show that
the proposed framework not only effectively detects adver-
sarial examples from different attack algorithms, but also
correctly classifies adversarial examples. Our framework
potentially gives a new perspective, i.e., a data-driven way,
to improve the robustness of a CNN model.
Figure 1: The input image is an adversarial example, and
its real label is a dog. It is misclassified as a cat by the
trained CNN. In our framework, we use the trained CNN to
extract the original image into an AFG. This AFG preserves
the class features, including the property of AFS. We use
AFG dataset to train a multi-label classifier to detect this
adversarial example and classifies the input image correctly.
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1. Introduction
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) achieve remark-
able success in a variety of tasks [5, 12, 14, 8]. However,
Szegedy and others [9, 29, 4, 16, 6] find that an original im-
age would be misclassified with high confidence via adding
a very small perturbation to it, which is called adversarial
example. Adversarial examples show that CNNs suffer se-
rious robustness problem even though good performance.
There are two main types of defense algorithms for ad-
versarial examples [1]. One is called the complete defense
which makes the model recognize adversarial example as
the correct class [10, 31]. For instance, Papernot [25] ap-
plies knowledge distillation to transfer knowledge of com-
plex models to simple networks, and then classifies adver-
sarial examples through simple networks. This method only
defends against small perturbation attacks. Gradient mask-
ing [30] makes the network be in unreachable states on the
gradient to prevent adversarial examples generation. When
under a stronger attack [2], the defendant will be broken
through and it has a highly complex computation. The
other is detection only [33, 32, 19] which sends an alarm
to potential adversarial examples to reject any further pro-
cessing. These methods use different image patterns from
model processing to detect adversarial examples. However,
these patterns cannot retain the class features. They cannot
know the original class of the image, and only reject all po-
tential adversarial examples. In summary, it is a challenge
to a defensive algorithm to detect adversarial examples and
classify them correctly. The basic reason is we do not have
an effective way to measure the difference between adver-
sarial example and original image in the feature space.
Our experiments show that the difference of feature maps
of adversarial examples and original images gradually be-
comes separable as the layers go deeper. We theoretically
analyze and verify this phenomenon, and call it Adversarial
Feature Separability (AFS). The AFS is a potential metric
to measure the change of adversarial example in the feature
space, which provides an insight that adversarial examples
can be detected in feature space. However, we need to ac-
quire the class features which have the representations of
the class to get the real class of adversarial example. The
group visualization method proposed by Olah [24] provides
a feasible way to interpret the internal representations of
CNNs by group features. We find these group features con-
tain the representations corresponding to the class of the in-
put image.
In this paper, we combine the above two ideas and pro-
pose an Adversarial Feature Genome (AFG) data organized
by stacking the stitched groups features of different layers.
AFG is encoded with representations of an image or adver-
sarial example of the model, which consists of group fea-
tures and a mixed label. These group features allow AFG to
detect adversarial example. The mixed label of each AFG
indicates its original label and a dynamic label. These two
labels are consistent for original images, but are different
for adversarial examples. This label encoding allows AFG
to be classified into the corresponding class. We transform
all images into AFGs to construct a big dataset. Finally, we
trained a multi-label classifier on the AFG database. The
multi-label classifier effectively detects adversarial exam-
ples from the original images and also correctly classifies
them. This recognition framework is shown in Figure 1.
The experiments demonstrate that under a variety of attack
algorithms, the proposed framework has a good defensive
ability in different models and correctly obtains the original
label of adversarial example. Our contributions are summa-
rized as follows:
• We discover that adversarial examples and original im-
ages can be measured in the feature space, which we
called Adversarial Feature Separability (AFS). More-
over, we observe that AFS become more obvious as
the layers go deeper.
• We create AFG data which contains group features
with AFS and a mixed label. It builds the foundation
for correctly classify adversarial example, and also
provides a new way for model interpretability.
• The multi-label classifier trained on the AFG dataset
can recognize adversarial examples. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first framework that can detect
and correctly classify adversarial examples simultane-
ously. This framework provides a new perspective to
design defensive attack algorithms.
2. Adversarial Feature Separability
To detect adversarial example, we need to know that the
difference between adversarial and original image. Adver-
sarial example by adding attack noise to the input allows
the model to give a false classification result with high con-
fidence [29]. Goodfellow [9] points out that linearity in
high-dimensional space is the reason to cause adversarial
example. Due to the under-fitting of the image space by the
linear portion of the deep model, the cumulative error has
an effect on the final result. However, we find that in the
feedforward of the same model for images and adversarial
examples, the difference of their feature maps is obvious
with the deepening of the layers, which we call Adversarial
Feature Separability (AFS).
First, we use neural networks to show the impact of at-
tack noise on the feedforward of the model. We defineX as
the original image, and its label is y. ρ is attack noise, which
is generated by optimization algorithms such as gradient de-
scent. This attack noise is highly targeted to the model and
belongs to a white-box attack. Adversarial example (X+ρ)
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can be defined by Eq.1.
min
ρ
‖ρ‖2 s.t. f(X + ρ) = yˆ. (1)
Adversarial example (X + ρ) makes the neural network
misclassify it into class yˆ. f(.) represents the classifier of
the neural network. The weights and biases of the first layer
of the neural network are defined as W and b. The differ-
ence between adversarial example and the original image
before the activation function is as follows:
(WX + b)− (W (X + ρ) + b) = Wρ. (2)
Despite both W and ρ are high-dimensional data, it is
not certain that Wρ brings errors. However, the classifica-
tion results show that y 6= yˆ, and yˆ has high confidence.
This also means that the distribution of results before y and
yˆ is quite different. The error of Wρ is passed from the
first layer to the last layer. The error is not reduced in the
feedforward of the neural network.
In CNNs, models have many convolution kernels, and
each convolutional kernel is used to extract a feature map.
The output feature maps of the convolution layer are the
input of the next convolution layer. They influence the fi-
nal inference. As with neural network analysis, the feed-
forward of CNNs also causes differences on each layer’s
feature maps due to attack noise. This shows that there are
differences in the feature space between the two input im-
ages, but it does not reflect that the difference will gradually
separate, that is, AFS. To measure whether there is AFS in
this difference, we define Pi as the feature maps of original
image in the i-th layer, Pˆi as the feature maps of adversarial
examples, and D(Pi||Pˆi) denotes a distance function of Pi
and Pˆi. The distance between feature maps at each layer
can be defined as
D(Pi||Pˆi) = ‖Pi − Pˆi‖‖Pi‖ , (3)
where ||.|| represents the Eular norm. We also apply KL
divergence [11] to measure the difference between the dis-
tribution of Pi and Pˆi in Eq.4.
DKL(Pi||Pˆi) =
∑
µj(Pij) log
µj(Pij)
µj(Pˆij)
, (4)
where Pij represents the feature map obtained by j-
th convolution kernel in the i-th layer, and µj(Pij) =∑
Pij/
∑
Pi is the empirical distribution through discrete
samples. Then, we generate some adversarial examples
on GoogleNet [28] with several attack algorithms, includ-
ing Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [9], Basic Iterative
(a) (b)
Figure 2: (a) Distance difference and (b) KL divergence
to measure the difference between adversarial example and
original image on each layer under different attack algo-
rithms. (a) and (b) show that as the layer becomes deeper,
the difference in the feature maps becomes larger for all at-
tack algorithms, which means that adversarial example and
the original image can be separated.
Methods (BIM) [13], and DeepFool [22]. We randomly
choose 100 classes from the ImageNet dataset, and each
class includes 200 images. The result of the experiment is
shown in Figure 2.
As shown in Figure 2, two measurement methods
demonstrate that the feature maps of adversarial examples
obtained by different attack algorithms are different from
those of the original images on each layer. This differ-
ence is small in the shallow layers, but increases with the
deepening of layers. The images and adversarial examples
have the property of AFS in the feature space. Their differ-
ences gradually become larger as the layers go deeper. Liao
[17] verified that when the input was added random noise,
and this difference did not change significantly with layer
changes. Therefore, attack noise is the cause of AFS, not
random noise.
3. Adversarial Feature Genome
The basic structure of Adversarial Feature Genome
(AFG) is that the group features of the input image on each
layer are obtained by the group visualization method. These
group features not only have the property of AFS, but also
represent different features of the input image, like gene ex-
pression. Besides, AFG has a mixed label of real and adver-
sarial classes. These two parts of AFG ensure that adversar-
ial example can be classified.
3.1. Group Features
The AFS can be used to detect adversarial examples, but
this property does not allow the model to classify adver-
sarial examples. We need to get the class features while
the adversarial features are separated. Olah [24] proposes a
group visualization method. This method can visualize the
features of the input image on each layer into several im-
portant group features.These group features can be used as
4323
Figure 3: The three sets of images and corresponding adversarial examples are conch and teddy, dog and cat, jellyfish and
paper towel. We get the group features of each input image on each layer of the model. In the shallow layers, group features
of adversarial examples and original images are similar but they differ in the deeper layers. Meanwhile, this difference also
reflects AFS.
class features of the input image.
In detail, for input imageX , Pi is the feature maps in the
i-th layer. It is a 4D tensor (Batch, Width, Height, Channel),
and Batch = 1. The dimension of Pi is high and contains
many redundant features. These redundant features have
little effect on the classification of X . To get meaningful
features, we need to reduce the dimensions of Pi. First,
we convert Pi to Pi(W×H),C . This means that each feature
maps of the layer are converted into column vectors and
merged into a matrix, and the matrix is a non-negative ma-
trix. Then, non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) [15]
is applied on Pi(W×H),C to reduce dimensions. We want to
find non-negative matrix factors U and V such that:
Pi(W×H),C ≈ (UV )(W×H),C =
r∑
a=1
U(W×H),aVa,C , (5)
where r represents the number of the group. Finally, we
apply activation maximization algorithm [7] on each group
to obtain the group features X∗ij as follows:
X∗ij = arg maxhij(U(W×H),jVj,C ,Θ
∗), (6)
where hij(X,Θ∗) is the value of the j-th group in the
i-th layer, and Θ is the weight set of CNN. The obtained
image X∗ij , an important group feature on the i-th convolu-
tion layer, makes the maximum activation of the j-th group
on the i-th layer. We visualize 3 pairs of adversarial ex-
ample and the original image shown in Figure 3. The group
features of adversarial examples and the original images are
similar in the shallow layer, but the difference in the deep
layer becomes larger. Meanwhile, according to the change
of the adversarial features, the features of adversarial exam-
ples and the original images are gradually separated. These
group features have the properties of AFS, and the details
can be seen in Experiment 5.2.
Group features are simple in shallow, but complex in
deep layers. In the deeper layers, features tend to become
more abstract and closer to semantic features. In each class,
objects have common features, such as the hair and ears of
a dog, the tip of a bird, and the spherical cap of a jellyfish.
The group features on each layer of the image show the clas-
sification of the image of the model. It is like the process of
gene expression, using the information in genes to synthe-
size gene products. Many visualization methods and anal-
ysis of the model [23, 34, 3] also prove that these semantic
features are obvious in the deep layer. These group features
have class features of the input image, and the details can
be seen in Experiment 5.3.
3.2. AFG Data Structure
The input image X gets r group features on each layer,
r denotes the number of groups. For instance, we choose
r = 4, and the size of X∗ij is 112 × 112. Each layer gen-
erates 4 group features of 112 × 112. We stitch four group
features together on the same layer to get a larger feature
224×224. Then the large features of all layers that become
a tensor 224× 224×N are stacked together. N represents
the number of layers. This tensor is the AFG of the input
image. AFG preserves the spatial relationship between fea-
tures while preserving the features of each layer.
When the model classifies adversarial example, the orig-
inal image is misclassified into other classes due to attack
noise. In this process, the adversarial features gradually de-
viate from the original features, and the original features of
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Original One-hot Misclassified One-hot Final Label
cat 10 cat 000 10000
cat 10 jellyfish 100 10100
cat 10 conch 010 10010
dog 01 dog 000 01000
dog 01 jellyfish 100 01100
dog 01 sturgeon 001 01001
Table 1: Cat and dog are labels for images. Jellyfish, conch
and sturgeon are adversarial labels. In the original image,
label ’10’ represents a cat and ’01’ represents a dog. In
adversarial example, the label ’100’ represents the jellyfish,
’010’ represents the conch, and ’001’ represents the squid.
When the cat image is misclassified as jellyfish, the AFG
label of the image is ’10100’.
the image have been transferred to other classes. From the
original class to the wrong class, we give AFG a mixed la-
bel. One label is the correct class, and the other is the class
of the model misclassified. The two labels of AFG of the
original image are correct class.
The mixed label of AFG is a one-hot encoding. We first
count the number of classes for all images and the number
of classes for adversarial examples. Moosavi [21] shows the
distance between the classes of the images and the classes
of adversarial examples. The number of original classes and
adversarial classes may not be the same. Simply, the total
number of classes is twice the number of original classes.
After determining the encoding length of the original labels
and the adversarial labels, one-hot encoding is used for each
of the two types of labels. The two labels of each AFG are
joined into a vector which is the final label of the AFG. The
encoding examples are shown in Table 1.
4. Data-driven Adversarial Examples Recogni-
tion Framework
We call the framework a data-driven adversarial exam-
ples recognition. The whole framework contains two clas-
sifiers, as shown in Figure 4. The first classifier is trained on
the original dataset to do a classification task. When the first
model is trained, adversarial examples are obtained from the
first classifier by the different attack algorithms. We get the
AFGs of all images via the first trained model. All AFGs
form a new dataset, and we turn the defense and classifi-
cation of adversarial examples into a multi-label classifica-
tion problem. A multi-label classifier trained on the AFG
datasets to detect adversarial examples. The second multi-
label classifier can choose a variety of algorithms, and the
results of different multi-label classifiers are shown in Ex-
periment 5.5.
AFG has labels for two classes. According to the confi-
dence of the two labels, the predicted results can reconfirm
the original classification results. When the two labels are
inconsistent, the image is an adversarial example. The dis-
tribution of the final prediction result can detect the original
label and misclassified label.
5. Experiments
5.1. Experimental Setup
The data-driven adversarial example recognition frame-
work requires two classifiers. In the experiment, we mainly
use two configurations, the first classification model se-
lects VGG16 [26] and GoogleNet [29] respectively, and the
second model uses VGG16. That is VGG16+VGG16 and
GoogleNet+VGG16. We randomly selected 100 classes on
the ImageNet dataset, each with 200 images, as the dataset
for the first model. For the trained model, we use the FGSM
[9], BIM [13], and DeepFool [22] attack algorithms to ob-
tain adversarial examples. Then we convert all images into
the AFG dataset. The second model is trained on the AFG
dataset. We use the SGD optimizer, which has a learning
rate of 0.001 and iterations of 500 epochs.
When training the first model, we fine-tune it on 100
classes through the pre-trained model. The final accuracy
of VGG16 is 89.81%, and the accuracy of GoogleNet is
91.23%. In the FGSM and BIM algorithms, the change
part is multiplied by a coefficient  to make the attack noise
small, and  = 0.005. We use the update strategy of L∞
metrics in BIM with a total of 100 iterations. The L∞ ver-
sion of the DeepFool attack is adopted, and it takes 80 iter-
ations.
We first validate group features of AFG have AFS prop-
erty and the class features, which is the foundation of the
framework. Then, we use different strategies to analyze the
recognition of AFGs under the second classifiers and the
results of multiple multi-label classifiers.
5.2. The AFS of AFGs
Since the AFS property of AFG is important, we first
need to verify that the classifier based on the AFG dataset
can detect adversarial example. We turn the second model
into a binary classification, and simplify the coding of AFG
label. A simplified label indicates that the AFG is from an
original image or adversarial example. The results of the
second model are compared with Detector algorithm. It is
a detection only method proposed by Metzen [20]. This
method proposes a small ”detector” to distinguish between
real data and adversarial example. It uses an extra model
to detect adversarial example as our method, but its method
does not correctly classify adversarial example. We use two
configurations with different attack algorithms, and the re-
sult is shown in Table 2.
The results in Table 2 show that among the three attack
algorithms, the accuracy of adversarial examples obtained
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Figure 4: A data-driven adversarial example recognition framework. After the training of the first classification model, the
framework can be divided into three steps. (1) We use the first classifier CNN to convert the input image into group features by
the group visualization method. (2) We stack all stitched group features to create an AFG for each input image. The number
of AFG channels is the same as the number of convolution layers. We construct a dataset from AFGs of all images. (3) The
defensive adversarial example is transformed into a multi-label classification problem. The second multi-label classifier is
trained on the AFG dataset. It can detect whether the input image is an adversarial example and the correct class of adversarial
example.
Configuration Method AFG Detector
VGG16+VGG16
FGSM 93.75% 89.01%
BIM 88.32% 87.14%
DeepFool 74.42% 82.13%
GoogleNet+VGG16
FGSM 88.94% 91.01%
BIM 93.41% 88.21%
DeepFool 72.44% 79.33%
Table 2: In both configurations, we use different attack al-
gorithms to verify the AFS of AFG, which is the ability to
distinguish between images and adversarial example. The
results are also compared with detector algorithm.
by DeepFool algorithm, whether AFG or detector, can be
correctly classified by the second model is relatively low.
For the FGSM and BIM algorithms, the accuracy of AFG
and detector is close. AFG can distinguish genuine image
from data containing adversarial examples.
In the VGG16+VGG16 configuration, the AFG obtained
by the FGSM algorithm better detects adversarial example,
while for the GoogleNet+VGG16 configuration, the AFG
obtained under the BIM algorithm better detects adversarial
examples. This may be due to structural differences in the
first model that causes the difficulty of generating adversar-
ial examples. Liu [18] suggested that it was more difficult
to get an adversarial example on VGG16. Olah [24] also
stated that the group features of GoogleNet were more se-
mantic and easier to understand than that of VGG16 [23].
This experiment shows that AFG does reserve the AFS
property to ensure this representation can distinguish adver-
sarial examples and original images.
5.3. The Class Features of AFGs
The AFG gets the original class of adversarial example,
which requires AFG to retain the feature difference and also
includes the class features of the corresponding input im-
age. We change all AFGs converted from genuine images
into single labels. Each label has the same class as the corre-
sponding input image. The second model is trained on this
dataset to do a multi-class classification. The experimental
results of the two configurations are shown in Table 3.
The results show that the second model under two con-
figurations has a good accuracy in recognizing AFG classes.
Compared with the first model, their accuracy rate has de-
creased. Although AFG contains the features of the in-
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Configuration Accuracy
VGG16+VGG16 78.31%
GoogleNet+VGG16 81.12%
Table 3: We train two sets of models on the original AFG
dataset. Each AFG has a label with the same of the input
image. The model is trained on the dataset to perform the
classification task to verify the class features of AFG.
put image, it is synthesized by several group features com-
pressed by the features on the layer. Compression of fea-
tures brings losses and errors. Besides, the AFG generation
is related to the first model, and AFG may contain informa-
tion about the first model. The number of channels of the
obtained AFG is related to the number of the layers of the
first model. A large number of channels increase the com-
plexity of the AFG. These factors make AFG of each input
image lose the features of the input image and increase the
training difficulty of the second model.
This experiment shows that AFG contains the class fea-
tures of the input image, which helps the multi-label clas-
sifier learn the AFG class while distinguishing adversarial
example.
5.4. The Recognition of AFGs
The AFS and class features of AFG ensure that the AFG
of adversarial example is potentially classified correctly.
We use all AFGs, including original images and adversarial
examples, as the dataset for the second multi-label classifier.
The two classes with the highest confidence in the predic-
tion result are compared with the two classes of the AFG
label. We choose intersection over union (IoU) to evalu-
ate the performance of the second multi-label model. The
results are shown in Table 4.
Method VGG16+VGG16 GoogleNet+VGG16
FGSM 49.41% 72.71%
BIM 52.12% 71.63%
DeepFool 55.62% 65.18%
Table 4: The performance of adversarial example recogni-
tion under different attack algorithms.
From the results, the multi-label classifier can get
the correct and misclassified classes of adversarial exam-
ple. However, under attack algorithms, the recognition of
GoogleNet+VGG16 is better than that of VGG16+VGG16.
In the VGG16+VGG16 configuration, the best result is to
detect adversarial examples obtained by DeepFool, and the
worst is adversarial examples from FGSM. This result is
contrary to the result of the GoogleNet+VGG16 configura-
tion. In GoogleNet+VGG16 configuration, the worst result
(a) (b)
Figure 5: (a) and (b) are training of AFGs obtained from
different attack algorithms under different configurations.
is for DeepFool, and the best is to classify adversarial exam-
ples from FGSM. We analyze the training process as shown
in Figure 5.
Under the three attack algorithms, the converge of
GoogleNet+VGG16 is fast and the test result is higher. The
VGG16+VGG16 is not easy to converge. In the Deep-
Fool algorithm, compared with adversarial examples from
VGG16, adversarial examples of GoogleNet are difficult to
distinguish. However, in the GoogleNet+VGG16 configu-
ration, it can better defend the DeepFool algorithm. Ac-
cording to the previous experimental analyses, the structural
differences of the models can make a great difference in the
generation of adversarial examples.
Besides, we find that for the same configuration, the IoU
under different attack algorithms is close. To explore the
generalization of the multi-label classifier obtained by one
attack algorithm on other attack algorithms for the same
configuration, we use the multi-label classifier obtained un-
der different attack algorithms to test the AFGs built on
other attack algorithms. The experimental results are shown
in Table 5.
Configuration Method FGSM BIM DeepFool
VGG16
+VGG16
FGSM 49.41% 31.14% 30.33%
BIM 37.65% 52.12% 34.87%
DeepFool 42.53% 42.12% 55.62%
GoogleNet
+VGG16
FGSM 72.71% 85.64% 82.03%
BIM 85.22% 71.63% 81.31%
DeepFool 85.54% 86.61% 65.18%
Table 5: Generalization of multi-label classifier obtained by
an attack algorithm on other attack algorithms.
From Table 5, for the GoogleNet+VGG16 configuration,
the multi-label classifier trained on any attack algorithm is
equal or better than that of the other two attack algorithms.
For the VGG16+VGG16 configuration, the results of the
trained multi-label classifier on the other two attack algo-
rithms are lower. This shows that multi-label classifier is
generalized to other attack algorithms. This generalization
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Method FGSM(1) BIM(1) DeepFool(1)
FGSM(2 ) 56.78% 45.66% 49.87%
BIM(2) 44.21% 34.90% 55.21%
DeepFool(2) 53.65% 48.43% 61.46%
Table 6: Generalization of multi-label classifier obtained by
an attack algorithm on other model.
is related to attack algorithms and the first model. To fur-
ther explore this generalization to defend other attack al-
gorithms, we use multi-label classifier obtained under (2)
the GoogleNet+VGG16 configuration to detect AFGs un-
der (1) the VGG16+VGG16 configuration. The result is
shown in Table 6. This result shows that even the multi-
label classifier obtained under another configuration, it still
has generalization when detecting adversarial examples of
other models, which provides a new idea for exploring the
transfer and universality of adversarial examples.
All Original Only Adversarial Only
AFG 71.63% 61.59% 84.61%
AFG-F3L3 62.21% 52.02% 86.64%
AFG-FML 68.77% 58.02% 85.42%
AFG-F3 60.32% 60.81% 82.47%
AFG-L3 67.31% 51.54% 85.08%
Table 7: Performance of different channel AFGs.
In the experiment, we use the all channels of AFG.
While AFG in different channels contains different fea-
tures, they may have different effects on defending ad-
versarial examples. In the BIM algorithm under the
GoogleNet+VGG16 configuration, we choose the first three
layers and the last three layers of the AFG data (AFG-
F3L3), the first/middle/last data (AFG-FML), the first only
data (AFG-F3), and the last only data (AFG-L3). On these
datasets, the multi-label classifier is trained to verify all the
AFG dataset, the real AFG dataset and the adversarial AFG
dataset. The results show that the IoU of the multi-label
classifier from the AFG-FML dataset decreases a little (Ta-
ble 7). When testing different types of data, full channel
AFG is better to detect real AFG data. For the adversarial
AFG dataset, it is better to select multi-label classifier from
the AFG-FML dataset. In the case of comparisons of AFG-
F3 and AFG-L3, the multi-label classifier from the AFG-
L3 dataset can better recognize the real AFG data, and the
AFG-L3 dataset can help classifier recognize the adversar-
ial AFG data. The results show that the AFG data can select
different channels for different application scenarios, which
also can effectively reduce the computational complexity of
AFG.
This experiment shows that the difficulty of AFG recog-
nition is related to the attack algorithms and the first model
Configuration IoU
GoogleNet+VGG16 71.63%
GoogleNet+GoogleNet 52.12%
GoogleNet+SVM 35.58%
Table 8: Performance of different multi-label classifiers.
structure. The multi-label classifier obtained under different
attack algorithms has generalization ability against various
attacker. We also can selectively use the channel of AFG.
5.5. The different multi-label classifiers
The adversarial example recognition framework relies on
a second multi-label classifier to detect adversarial exam-
ples, and the choice of the second model is flexible. Dif-
ferent classifiers have different defensive abilities. Besides
VGG16, we chose other classifiers as the second model, in-
cluding GoogleNet and SVM [27].
We use GoogleNet as the first model, and the AFG
dataset obtained by the BIM algorithm is used as the dataset
of the second model training. The results are shown in Ta-
ble 8. The recognition results of AFG by different classifiers
vary greatly. The result of the VGG16 to detect adversarial
examples is good, while the SVM results are the worst.
The results show that the deep model is better than the
shallow model on classifying AFG into the real class. This
may because that AFG has a large dimension and contains
complex features, and it makes the second model more dif-
ficult to converge, especially for shallow models like SVM.
GoogleNet should be able to converge on this dataset
well, but the results differ greatly from VGG16. In the
course of training, the training curve of GoogleNet fluc-
tuates greatly and converges slowly. This is in sharp con-
trast to the training process of VGG16. As in the sec-
ond section of the experimental analysis, the group fea-
tures of GoogleNet and VGG16 differ greatly in seman-
tics, and the difficulty of generating adversarial examples
varies. The reason for the poor results of AFG classifica-
tion by GoogleNet may be related to the structure of the
model.
This experiment shows that the flexibility of the second
classifier selection. Without changing the first model, we
can defend against multiple attack algorithms. The second
model can even improve the final result by learning multiple
multi-label models through ensemble learning.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new paradigm, i.e. data
driven paradigm, for adversarial example defending meth-
ods. This paradigm is built on the fact we observed: the
original image and adversarial example are gradually sepa-
rated in feature space, i.e. AFS. Inspired by AFS, We build
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AFG which consists of group features and a mixed label. It
can help classifier to detect adversarial examples and trace it
original label. We transform images and adversarial exam-
ple into the AFG dataset, and turn an adversarial examples
defending problem into a multi-label classification problem.
The multi-label classifier trained on the AFG dataset can
get the original label of adversarial example and has gen-
eralization for other attack algorithm. The second model
and the channel of AFG can also be applied flexibly. Our
framework potentially gives a new perspective to defense
adversarial examples.
In future works, we will encode the AFG database with
more variables such as the architecture and hyperparame-
ters of CNN models, to train a more universal model which
has strong robustness to adversarial examples generated by
different methods.
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